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DETECTION & RESPONSE

Fourteen findings. One case, with a verdict.

The agent watches credential theft, persistence, defence evasion, lateral movement and pre-ransomware behaviour in real time. What reaches your analyst is not that stream. It is one case that asks the first question worth asking: is this real?

41
attack chains checked per device
18
attack patterns behind a story
10
response actions inside the case
90
days re-read once it is confirmed
02:41 · ONE NIGHT, ONE CASE

How fourteen findings become one decision.

One case, minute by minute. On the left, what the agent reported. On the right, what Secuno made of it.

REPORTED BY THE AGENTEXAMPLEWHAT SECUNO MAKES OF IT
    • registry · Run key written
    • file drop · user folder
    • file drop · user folder
    02:41
    RECORDED

    Findings, not alerts.

    Each finding is kept with the technique the agent actually reported. Nobody is paged for a single one.

    • process start · powershell.exe
    • script block · loader
    02:44
    CHAIN

    A chain reads as a chain.

    Forty-one attack chains are checked on each device inside a fixed 30-minute window. A file drop followed by a new startup entry is one of them, so these are one sequence and not five unrelated rows.

    • 14 findings · 3 correlated signals
    02:44
    STORY

    One case, with a verdict.

    The cluster is matched against eighteen known attack patterns. At 70% confidence the story opens an investigation with a verdict, a MITRE ATT&CK timeline and one recommended action.

    • isolate_network · dispatched
    • activity trail · recorded
    02:47
    RESPONSE

    Contained without leaving the case.

    The analyst isolates the host from inside the investigation. The action is recorded in the case next to the notes and the status changes.

    • status · confirmed
    02:53
    DWELL TIME

    Detected today. Started when?

    Once confirmed, Secuno re-reads the device's last ninety days to find the probable first access, and counts the NIS2 Article 23 clocks from it.

Evidence collected by the agent's urgent uplink: 14 findings recorded across 4 finding types and 3 correlated signals, with a note that the batches fall between 08:25:45 and 08:41:12 inside a 30-minute correlation window, above an attack chain running from a registry persistence key through two file drops to a PowerShell process
The evidence view of a real case: three correlated batches, one window, one case.How correlation worksAttack stories and dwell time
MEASURED TRIAGE

Every open case says which way it leans.

Every close records one outcome. Each night every detection gets a track record from those outcomes, per client and across the fleet, judged on a conservative bound.

How verdicts are measured
OPEN CASES
LIKELY MALICIOUS

The record says act.

Detections like this one were usually real when your analysts decided them.

NEEDS YOU

No honest lean yet.

Too little history to call it either way, so a person decides and that decision becomes the record.

LIKELY BENIGN

Earned, never assumed.

At least 95% benign at worst, over 50 or more decided cases. Closing these automatically is a switch per client, off by default.

NEVER CALLED BENIGN, WHATEVER THE RECORD SAYS
  • Credential theft
  • Canaries
  • Log clearing
  • Tampering
  • Indicator matches

Inside a case, each detection gets its own verdict, and one that is about something else moves to a case of its own.

RESPONSE

Ten actions, and what each one refuses.

Seven on the device and three on the Microsoft 365 account, all from inside the case. The backend checks every command against an allow-list before it is queued, and the agent checks it again.

DOESREFUSES
isolate_network

Blocks all traffic except loopback, the agent itself, DNS and DHCP, in a single filtering transaction.

Refused outright if the Windows filter engine is unavailable or the agent cannot resolve its own path, and the console says why.

kill_process_tree

Ends a process and every descendant, because the encryptor is often the child of what was detected.

Any process it cannot confirm by identity and start time, and it stops at forty.

quarantine_file

Moves the file into quarantine with a manifest recorded beside it.

Files in the Windows system, WOW64 or component-store directories.

Isolation carries a local time-to-live, renewed by every heartbeat. A device you cannot reach rejoins the network instead of sitting cut off with no way back.

The response actions panel inside a Secuno investigation: isolate host, terminate process, quarantine file and collect forensics, noted as dispatched to the affected workstation and recorded in this investigation's activity
The response panel inside an investigation.
ON THE DEVICE
  • isolate_network
  • unisolate_network
  • kill_process
  • kill_process_tree
  • quarantine_file
  • stop_service
  • disable_service
ON THE ACCOUNT
  • Revoke sessions
  • Disable account
  • Enable account
QUESTIONS

The things worth asking first.

How is an investigation different from a risk?

A risk asks what to fix and carries an owner, a deadline and remediation steps. An investigation asks whether a behavioural signal is real at all. It runs new, triaging, then confirmed or dismissed, and a confirmed case escalates into a formal incident or a risk when remediation is actually required.

Can a slow attacker hold the correlation window open?

No. The window is a fixed length and deliberately does not slide. A sliding window can be held open indefinitely by a low-and-slow signal, and that is precisely the case where an accurate start time matters most.

If we isolate a device, can we lose it?

The isolation filters are installed in a single transaction that always carries the agent's own exception, so the host is never blocked without a way for the agent to talk back, and the command is refused outright if the agent cannot resolve its own path. Isolation then carries a local time-to-live renewed by each successful heartbeat, so an unreachable device rejoins the network instead of being stranded.

What does an auditor get afterwards?

The case activity trail records every status change, assignment, escalation, analyst note and dispatched response action. Incidents add an owner, affected devices and users, responder assignment, linked risks and tickets, and a post-incident report with a PDF export, and every create, edit, status change, owner change, delete and restore is in the audit log. Investigations measure detection latency and time to first verdict over ninety days. Case reports print without cards splitting across a page boundary mid-evidence.

06:00 · DAYBREAK

The night is on record. The case is closed.

Bring us a noisy endpoint. We will walk a live case end to end, from the signals that opened it to the action that closed it.