We sell security. So ours has to hold.
Where the data lives, who can reach it, and how every report from every agent is proven before it is accepted. Written for the technical lead who has to answer the client's security questionnaire.
Last reviewed 20 October 2026
- 01IdentityA key that belongs to one device
- 02HashThe body is fingerprinted
- 03SignSeven fields, one signature
- 04TransportTLS 1.3 by default
- 05VerifyChecked before it is read
What you can hold us to
Plain sentences first. The mechanisms behind each one are in the dossier.
Hosted in the Netherlands
Client data is stored and processed on Secuno's own servers in the Netherlands, and does not leave the EU.
No outside AI, ever
The AI engine runs on the same servers. Inventories, CVE data and risk records are never sent to OpenAI, Anthropic, Google or any other AI provider.
Every client sealed off
Tenant separation is enforced by the database itself, underneath the application's own checks.
Every action on the record
72 audited action types, with who, when, from where, and the old and new value. Logs cannot be deleted from the interface.
What the platform will not do
Some protections are not settings. They are paths that do not exist.
How an agent report is trustedNEVERLoad an unsigned rule set
Detection rules are Ed25519-signed and verified before they load. A build without the public key accepts no rule set at all. An unsigned path would be a remote-execution channel into every agent, so there is none.
NEVERRun a command outside the allow-list
The server checks every response command against eighteen allowed types before it is queued, and signs the order once, with an expiry, so it runs only once. A process kill carries the image and start time the detection saw, so it cannot hit a recycled process ID. Kills never hit critical system processes, and protected or boot-critical services cannot be stopped or disabled.
NEVERStrand an isolated device
Network isolation is installed in one transaction with the agent's own exception, and expires locally unless a heartbeat renews it. An unreachable device rejoins the network instead of being cut off with no way back.
NEVERLet support act unseen
Support can step into a user's session for at most thirty minutes, under a banner that cannot be dismissed. Every action is logged as the admin acting on the user's behalf.
NEVERTrust an IP address a client supplies
A device's public address is used for display, location and audit context only, never for an authorisation decision, because the client supplies the headers it comes from. Sign-in rules such as an allowed-countries list read the address the platform's own edge establishes from trusted hops.
NEVERPut a token in a URL
No session or sign-in token ever appears in a URL, there is no self-registration, and enrolment tokens are shown once and stored only as a hash.
NEVERBlock a device's own lifelines
An indicator block can never target the platform's own addresses, known remote-management vendors or a customer's gateway. On the device a block never covers the gateway or DNS servers, and it lapses when the platform stops renewing it.
NEVERAsk a user for a password
Restart prompts carry no links and always say that Secuno never asks for a password. Secrets in command lines and scripts are redacted on the device before anything is uploaded.
You do not have to take our word for it
These are the security headers the platform API sends on every response. Run the command and compare.
Our security contact is published in security.txt (RFC 9116).$ curl -sI https://app.secuno.nl/api/health
HTTP/2 200
strict-transport-security: max-age=15552000; includeSubDomains; preload
content-security-policy: default-src 'none'; script-src 'self'; … frame-ancestors 'none'
cross-origin-opener-policy: same-origin
cross-origin-resource-policy: same-origin
cross-origin-embedder-policy: require-corp
permissions-policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), …
referrer-policy: same-origin
x-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN
x-content-type-options: nosniff
Every mechanism, written down
This page is the short version. The dossier is the long one: built for the technical lead who has to fill in a client's supplier questionnaire.
Open the dossier- 01Supplier questionnaireThe answers clients ask forReady answers for NIS2 supplier checks, each one copyable.
- 02Agent to platformOne report, proven five waysThe signed request, step by step, and a replay being refused.
- 03Tenant isolationThree locks, not oneApplication, database and service: three separate locks.
- 04Accounts and accessWho gets in, and howSign-in, roles, sessions and what support can and cannot do.
- 05Shared responsibilityWho looks after whatWhat we secure, and what stays with you.
- 06Full referenceEvery control, for the reviewerEvery remaining detail, grouped and collapsible.
Found something? Tell us first.
Report a vulnerability in secuno.nl or the Secuno platform privately to [email protected], in English or Dutch. Include what you found and how to reproduce it. We confirm receipt, keep you informed while we fix it, and ask that you do not publish details until a fix is out.
Need answers for a client's questionnaire?
Send it to us. We answer security reviews and due-diligence questions, and walk you through any layer in detail.