From approval to verified, every step on the record.
Start with the fixes that remove the most of a client's risk. One deployment policy per client then decides how updates arrive, when devices restart and what users are told. Every install is followed through the restart, checked on the way back up and verified only when the vulnerabilities it fixes are closed. Windows and Linux.
- Delivery
- Approved updates install inside the client's maintenance window, in batches sized to fit the time it has left.
- Reboot
- A user may postpone a restart four times. After 72 hours the device restarts anyway, with a 30-minute final countdown, and never between 22:00 and 07:00 device time.
- Preflight
- Nothing installs when disk space or power is short, on a metered connection, while someone presents, with another restart pending, or in the first 10 minutes after boot.
- Notification
- Users hear about it 15 minutes before the first batch, and the restart prompt carries the client's own logo, colour and language.
- Clock from detection
- 24 hours
- Restart
- Forced
- Postponements
- One, of 15 minutes
- Outside the window
- Only if you allow it
Most patching stops one step short.
An update installs, Windows asks for a restart, and the device sits half-patched until somebody happens to reboot it. Patch compliance then looks better than it is by exactly as long as users go without restarting. Secuno treats the restart, and the health check after it, as part of the deployment.
Fewer half-patched devices
A device that needs a restart gets a restart plan with a real deadline. The fix no longer waits weeks for someone to reboot, and a device that did not come back is a finding, not a mystery.
No surprised users
Users see one sentence, the real deadline and how many postponements they have left, branded as their own IT provider. Quiet hours hold every restart, so nobody loses a machine late at night.
Every decision on the record
Each patch carries a decision log built from what actually happened to it: approval, lane, holds, restarts and postponements. When a client asks why a machine was not patched, the answer is already written down.
Start with the fixes that remove the most risk.
A client with hundreds of missing updates does not need a longer list. The Remediation Plan puts the fixes that remove the most of that client's open risk in order, tells you how many actions it takes to reach 80%, and checks afterwards that the vulnerabilities really closed.
The shortest path to 80%
Each row is one action: a Windows update, an app update through winget, a Linux package, removing an app nobody has used in 90 days, or a mitigation where nothing else fixes the finding. A row counts only the risk no row above it already removes, so the running total is real and the header says how many actions reach 80%.
Act from the row
Approve the update for the whole client or only for the devices in that row, remove an unused app with a reason, or apply a mitigation. Before anything is removed, each device is checked again for the app still being installed and unused. Devices that no longer qualify are skipped and listed.
Verified means the CVEs closed
A successful install is not yet a fix. A device counts as Verified only when a later inventory shows every CVE the update covers closed. If one is still open, the step fails and names the devices still vulnerable, so a quiet failure cannot hide behind a green install.
A workaround when there is no patch yet
Twelve vendor workarounds are built in, among them Follina, SMBv1 off, PrintNightmare's remote spooler off, two attack surface reduction rules and PwnKit on Linux. Apply and revert them from the console, each with a reason and an expiry: 90 days by default, a year at most.
Credited only while it holds
The agent reports each mitigation as applied or absent on every inventory. One undone on the device turns Drifted, one past its date turns Expired, and both notify the client's users. A tracked mitigation takes 70% off the finding's risk, and only while the device reports it applied.
No fix, said out loud
Findings with no known fix are counted as such instead of quietly dropping out of the plan, and risks you have accepted or marked as false positives are left out. The 80% is measured against work that can actually be done.
One policy per client, readable as four sentences.
Delivery, reboot, preflight and notification. Each clause is shown as a sentence built from its own values, so an account manager can read a client's policy back to the client without translating settings.
- Defaults that work on day one: workstations may postpone a restart four times, restart by a 72-hour deadline with a 30-minute final countdown, and keep quiet hours from 22:00 to 07:00 in their own local time
- Servers never restart on their own unless you decide otherwise
- A device group can carry its own policy, which wins for its members, so the finance team and the warehouse do not have to share one
- Policy templates for rings, deployment policy and group policies: apply one to fill in what a client is missing or to overwrite it, see where a client has drifted from it, and have a partner's default template applied to every new client
- Install steps from a fixed catalogue on Windows: stop or start a service, close a process, skip while a process runs, wait until healthy, or require a reboot. Protected services cannot be touched
- Maintenance windows govern Windows updates and third-party software alike, decide whether a restart is allowed at all, and can be evaluated in each device's own time zone. They repeat weekly, on the Nth weekday of the month or on Patch Tuesday plus N days, and the editor shows the next three openings
Five ways to restart, from never to forced.
Every device that needs a restart gets one plan in one of five modes. Updates that arrive while a plan is open join it, so a device restarts once per set of installs instead of once per update.
A prompt that tells the truth
One sentence, the real deadline and the real number of postponements left, with the client's logo and accent colour, in Dutch, French or English. The choices are set by the platform, and every postponement is spent from the budget and recorded.
A countdown that cannot be clicked away
The final countdown is the operating system's own dialog, which cannot be dismissed. It is not a surprise, because the prompt has been showing the deadline all along.
Quiet hours hold every mode
Quiet hours and a closed maintenance window hold every restart mode, so a deadline that expires at 23:00 waits for the morning. With nobody logged on, a deferrable restart happens straight away; a locked session waits until it is unlocked.
Restart now, with five minutes' warning
An operator can restart a device on the spot. The user gets a fixed five-minute warning, and that restart is never held.
Self-service from the tray
On Windows, users get a tray icon to restart now, postpone, check for updates or contact support. It can do only what the prompt would allow, and every action is checked again by the platform and recorded.
Every pending restart on one screen
Devices listed by deadline, with past-deadline and did-not-return devices flagged. Restart now, extend with a reason, or cancel, and a postponement report shows who keeps pushing back.
Did it come back healthy?
A restart is not the end of the deployment. The agent reports back every time it starts, and that report carries evidence of how the machine came up.
A device that does not return is a finding
A device that does not report back after a restart gets a high-severity did-not-return finding, judged against the hours that device is normally online, so a laptop closed for the evening is not mistaken for a machine stuck on a boot screen. You hear about the stuck one before its user calls.
Healthy means evidence, not a heartbeat
Services that were running before and are down now, a bugcheck, a boot loop or a spike in application crashes fail the plan. Each raises a high-severity finding that says what to do, and counts against the rollout ring the device is in.
No evidence is not good news
A return that arrives without a health snapshot is recorded as unmeasured. It is never counted as healthy.
Urgency set by exploitation, not by a severity label.
Every Windows update, app update and Linux package sits in one of four lanes, set by the CVEs it fixes, and each lane starts a clock at detection. The lane also shortens the approval wait and the ring soak, without changing the rules for what counts as a successful rollout.
Seen exploited here
A responder can record from the CVE page that a CVE was exploited at this client, and every update that fixes it moves to Emergency for that client until the observation is resolved. It is also recorded automatically, with its case, when a firewall exploit attempt naming the CVE reaches a device with an open risk for it, or a Sigma or YARA rule naming it matches with full confidence. An automatic record is withdrawn after 14 days unseen, or when its case closes as a false positive or authorised.
Recalculated when the facts change
Lanes are recalculated at approval, the moment a CVE is added to the KEV catalogue, and every night. A new KEV entry also checks affected clients at once instead of waiting for the next sweep. An app or Linux upgrade that fixes no known CVE stays Deferred, and software lanes show on the patch dashboard with the most overdue packages.
One emergency push, every affected client
Emergency installs restart forced, with one 15-minute postponement. When a KB has to go out everywhere, one request pushes it to every chosen client: approved, past the remaining rings and allowed outside the maintenance window for 1 to 72 hours. One person asks, a different person approves, and an unapproved request expires after 8 hours. Only Emergency-lane patches and fixes for a KEV-listed CVE qualify, and each client's restart policy still applies.
When an install is held, you can see why.
Six checks run before every batch. If one fails, the work goes back to the queue with its attempt refunded, and the reason is on screen rather than buried in a log.
- A reading the platform cannot take never holds an install, so a missing measurement cannot stall a client's patching
- A hold older than 72 hours becomes a high-severity risk, so a stuck device surfaces on its own
- One page lists every reason an install is not happening, and each device has its own deployment view
Batches sized to the window
Each update's install time is estimated from the fleet's median over its last 50 installs, or 8 minutes with no history. Updates are packed until the window's remaining time, less the restart allowance, is used. What does not fit waits for the next window without spending an attempt.
Content before the window
Updates can be downloaded ahead of time without installing, using Windows Update's own downloader or the Linux package manager's download-only mode. Staged content goes first in the next batch. On Windows the agent sets Delivery Optimization's download mode and bandwidth cap from the policy; there is no peer-to-peer transfer between agents.
Failures that stop, and say so
An update that fails three times in a row on a device stops retrying there and raises one medium-severity risk. When the same version fails like this on a quarter of a ring or client, one high-severity risk covers them all. Retry is one audited click, and a broken update service is reported as exactly that instead of as every update in the batch failing. A Windows Update error code is translated into a reason, where the problem lies and the first thing to try.
Approval arms a patch. The window decides when it lands.
Approval and timing are separate decisions on purpose. A patch can be approved automatically after a waiting period you set per client and per severity, then moves through rollout rings that have to earn the next stage.
Let the vendor find the bad update first
Set a waiting period of 72 hours or more before auto-approval, and an update the vendor pulls in its first three days never reaches your clients.
Rings that treat silence as a warning
Each ring's verdict counts eligible, reported and succeeded devices separately, so nothing coming back is never mistaken for everything working. A ring that fails during its soak stops at once, a ring that goes quiet counts as a regression, and a halted ring rolls back in one click. Each ring is judged on its own devices, and a new release goes through the rings again rather than inheriting a finished rollout.
Roll back the fleet, and stay there
Roll a bad app release back for a ring, a client or one device group. Each device returns to its previous version and is pinned, the bad version is declined until the next release, and devices that cannot roll back are listed with the reason. Linux packages roll back too, on apt, dnf, yum and zypper. Windows updates roll back only where Windows itself allows it, and the agent reports which those are.
Approve or block one device
Windows, Linux and winget updates can be approved for chosen devices only while the rest of the client waits, and a single device can be blocked without withdrawing approval for the rest of the estate.
Every exception has an owner and an end date
Each decline and device block is listed with an owner and an expiry within a year, lapsed, expiring and unowned first. When the date passes, a decline goes back to needing approval and a block is lifted, so a temporary exception never becomes permanent by accident.
A broken scan changes nothing
Windows Update never says an update is superseded; it just stops offering it. Secuno retires one only after a scan that succeeded, ran online and was complete, because a broken update agent looks exactly like a fully patched device.
Built for the machines that are hardest to patch.
The servers you cannot restart at will, the workstations locked down with application control, and the Linux hosts where an upgrade restarts services.
Servers restart in order
A restart group restarts a set number of servers at a time, in the order you choose, with a health check between each, so a bad update stops at the first server instead of taking down the whole set.
No restart without a proven backup
Switch it on and a server's installs and restarts wait until it has a recent enough backup, 7 days by default. The evidence is read from the server itself (VSS, Windows Server Backup, Veeam) and from Veeam Backup & Replication, Datto BCDR and Azure Backup through integrations. A source that cannot be read never counts as no backup, and an operator's attestation is audited and expires after 24 hours.
Patching that application control allows
Windows updates are installed by talking to the Windows Update Agent directly, not by launching PowerShell, which is exactly what WDAC, AppLocker and Constrained Language Mode exist to block. Update titles never appear in a process command line.
Per-user apps, patched for the user
Third-party software updates run through the Windows Package Manager, under the same approvals and maintenance windows as Windows updates. Apps are scanned as the system and as each signed-in user, then installed in the right context: a per-user app is updated in every active session, remote desktop hosts included, instead of a second copy landing under a service account while the vulnerable one stays put.
Linux: reported by default, installed when you say so
The Linux agent reports pending apt and dnf updates from the host's existing package data without refreshing it, so it never takes the administrator's lock. Installing is switched on in the agent settings and is off by default, because a package upgrade restarts services. Updates keep architectures apart, and each install is checked against the version that actually landed.
Linux restarts, the Linux way
Linux desktops get a restart prompt and Linux servers a wall message, under the same deployment policy as everything else.
Every update, and every decision about it, in one place.
Windows updates and third-party software share one Updates list, with the lane, the deployment track and a default view of what needs you.
- A decision log per patch, read straight from what the deployment recorded rather than a summary written afterwards
- Windows updates carry the CVEs they fix, taken from Microsoft's own security update feed, so a pending update and the vulnerability it closes are one conversation
- From a vulnerability risk, Remediate approves the fixing upgrade for one device only while the package stays pending for the rest of the client. The approval clears after a successful install, so today's fix never pre-approves next month's release
- Patch reports run on a schedule you set, so a client hears how patching went without anyone assembling it by hand. They include software compliance and KEV remediation per device and CVE: fixed within the Emergency lane's 24 hours, and within CISA's due date
- Approving and scheduling a patch are automation actions, so a rule can move routine work without a person clicking each one
- Auto-approve rules match on vendor, product, KB, title or only superseded updates, can also decline, and one rule can cover several clients. A decline beats an approval, but never a person's decision or the Emergency lane
- New rules start in Report only ("Would have approved N updates on M devices") until you switch them to enforce. A rule approves a version, not the package forever: the next release is judged against the rules as they are then
- A By KB view shows one update across the whole fleet, with bulk actions on up to 5,000 matching updates at once
- Every patch decision is in the audit log with who, when and why: approvals, schedules, declines, rollbacks, per-device allows and blocks, ring changes and emergency installs
- Patch this CVE opens a ticket linked to the patches that fix it, and Approve fix on a CVE or risk refuses a patch Microsoft does not list as fixing that CVE
- Auto-approve rules can target the Emergency lane and KEV fixes. The Emergency patches template opens that rule pre-filled, in report-only mode
The things worth asking first.
Will users be forced to restart in the middle of a meeting?
Not by default. Workstations get a deferrable restart: four postponements, a 72-hour deadline and a 30-minute final countdown, with quiet hours from 22:00 to 07:00. Someone presenting or in fullscreen holds the install before it even starts. The only forced restarts are Emergency-lane installs, which still offer one 15-minute postponement, and a Restart now that an operator chooses to send, which gives five minutes' warning.
What happens to servers?
Servers never restart on their own by default. Updates install and wait, and the restart happens when you run it or through a restart group, which restarts a set number of servers at a time, in order, with a health check between each. With the backup check on, a server's installs and restarts are held until a recent backup is proven, read from VSS, Windows Server Backup or Veeam on the server, or from Veeam Backup & Replication, Datto BCDR or Azure Backup through an integration. If a server does not report back after a restart, judged against the hours it is normally online, a high-severity finding is raised.
Does it work where PowerShell is locked down?
Yes. Windows updates are installed through the Windows Update Agent directly, so WDAC, AppLocker and Constrained Language Mode do not block patching. A transitional PowerShell fallback still exists while the fleet moves over. It is logged every time it runs and goes once nothing needs it.
Can we roll back?
For apps, yes, across the fleet: roll a release back for a ring, a client or a device group, and each device returns to its previous version and is pinned, so the next update does not undo it. Linux packages roll back on apt, dnf, yum and zypper. A halted rollout ring rolls back in one click. For Windows updates, only what Windows itself allows to be removed, and the agent reports which updates those are. A rolled-back patch cannot be queued again until someone reverses the rollback.
What about Linux?
Linux agents report pending apt and dnf updates without refreshing package metadata, so they never take the administrator's lock. Installing is off by default because an upgrade restarts services; you switch it on in the agent settings. Updates can be downloaded ahead of the window, desktops get a restart prompt and servers a wall message.
How is an actively exploited vulnerability handled?
When a CVE is added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue, the updates that fix it move to the Emergency lane with a 24-hour clock from detection. Recording that it was exploited at a client, by hand or automatically from a firewall exploit attempt or a Sigma or YARA match naming it, does the same for that client. Emergency installs restart forced with one 15-minute postponement, and with the per-client emergency override switched on they can run outside the maintenance window.
Where do we start on a client with hundreds of missing updates?
With the Remediation Plan. It lists the fixes that remove the most of that client's open risk, in order, and says how many actions reach 80%. Each row counts only what the rows above it do not already remove, so the running total is honest. A fix only counts as Verified once a later inventory shows its CVEs closed.
What if the vendor has not shipped a patch yet?
Apply one of twelve built-in vendor workarounds from the console, such as Follina, SMBv1 off or PrintNightmare's remote spooler off, with a reason and an expiry. The agent checks it on every inventory: undone on the device it turns Drifted, past its date it turns Expired, and both notify the client's users. It lowers the finding's risk only while it is applied.
Finish every deployment. Surprise nobody.
Tell us how your clients patch today, and we will show you the same estate with a deployment policy, a restart plan and a decision log behind it.